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CHAPTER 1
Epistemology from a Sanskritic  
Point of View
JONARDON  GANERI
1.  A CASE OF FALSE COGNATES
It is far from uncommon when reading translations of Sanskrit philo-
sophical texts into English to encounter the neologisms “true knowledge,” 
“false knowledge,” “valid knowledge,” and “invalid knowledge.” At first 
sight these phrases seem to indicate something amiss in the translator’s 
understanding of the concept of knowledge, for if knowledge is factive, 
then surely phrases like “false knowledge” and “invalid knowledge” are 
oxymorons (as in “faith unfaithful kept him falsely true”)? If it is a con-
ceptual truth about the English verb know that “S knows that p” entails 
or presupposes that p, then the “true” in the phrase “true knowledge” is 
redundant. In fact, these curious neologisms are very revealing about var-
iations in the use of epistemic terminology between English and Sanskrit, 
something that becomes clear when one looks to see which Sanskrit terms 
are getting translated in this way. The key term being translated as “know-
ledge” is the Sanskrit noun jñāna, derived from the verb jñā. This noun is 
cognate with Latin cognosere, with Greek gnosis, and so with English know-
ledge. In everyday Sanskrit usage, it is indeed often rightly translated as 
“knowledge,” and that is also the meaning one will find if one looks it up in 
a Sanskrit– English dictionary. Yet, and this is where confusion comes in, 
there is another meaning of jñāna, more common in the philosophical lit-
erature but also current in popular usage, where a better translation would 
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be cognition. Unlike to know, to cognize is not a factive verb, and when an 
event of cognition arises, there is a further question as to whether it is 
true or false. When used this way, the contrast being emphasized is with 
affective and conative states. A similar confusion has been noted with re-
gard to the translation of Latin cognitio as used in early modern European 
works. Jonathan Bennett (1984) notes, for example, that the translation of 
cognitio as “knowledge” rather than as “cognition” “has negatively affected 
scholarship on Spinoza” ( ). Thus, in philosophical Sanskrit, jñāna is a false 
cognate of English knowledge.
This fact is significant because the same term is inherited in many 
modern Indian languages including Hindu. So when experiments are 
conducted whose aim is to test the Gettier intuitions of Hindi speakers, 
and when the experimental questionnaire is translated from English into 
Hindu using jñāna as a translation for knowledge, the apparent discovery 
that Hindi speakers do not share anglophone intuitions about Gettier cases 
may be an aberration resulting from the use of a false cognate rather than 
constituting a genuine experimental finding about cross- cultural varia-
tion. There is an even greater risk of confusion when the test is performed 
in English on Indians speaking English as a second language. For what 
happens then is that the subject mentally translates the English word 
knowledge in the test scenario into Hindi jñāna, and is willing to say of a 
case that there is knowledge, but meaning only to assert thereby that there 
is cognition (see also Turri 2013, 9– 13, and Seyedsayamdost 2015 for evi-
dence that earlier reports of differences in Gettier intuitions among South 
Asians are not borne out by empirical study).
In philosophical Sanskrit, jñāna is distinguished from another epistemic 
term, pramā. The noun pramā is derived from the verb pra+mā, meaning 
“to measure.” This noun, unlike jñāna, is indeed used factively; indeed, in 
standard works it is explicated as meaning an experience that represents 
things as they are (yathārtha- anubhūti). It is pramā which ends up being 
translated as “true knowledge” or “valid knowledge” by translators wishing 
to preserve this point and nevertheless regarding knowledge as a true cog-
nate of jñāna. Matilal (2002) has summed up the whole situation rather well:
The Sanskrit term pramā is usually translated by a careful translator today 
as “knowledge.” This is certainly an improvement upon the older and wrong 
translation of pramā as “valid knowledge.” It may be of some interest to see 
why such a mistaken phrase was offered by earlier (mostly Indian) scholars as 
a translation of pramā. A pramā is usually regarded as a special kind of jñāna 
whose truth is guaranteed. This is mostly, though not always, true in Sanskrit 
(classical) philosophical literature. The word jñāna, however, is sometimes used 
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for “knowledge” in ordinary Sanskrit. A knowledgeable person is called jñānin. 
Even in philosophical Sanskrit the distinction between jñāna (which can be 
better translated as a cognitive event or an awareness- episode) and pramā is not 
always maintained, and hence we see jñāna used indiscriminately for pramā; and 
it is left to us to gather from the context whether an ordinary cognitive event 
or a piece of knowledge is being referred to. This interchangeability of jñāna for 
pramā has apparently led modern interpreters of Indian philosophy to confuse 
the issue, and most of them have felt the need for some adjective like “valid” to 
qualify “knowledge” in order apparently to gain the full force of pramā which is 
distinct from ordinary awareness. This was at best misleading and at worst a 
blunder that perpetuated misunderstanding of Indian philosophical doctrines 
by English readers. (150)
2.  PERFORMATIVE SANSKRIT PRAMĀ VERSUS  
STATIC ENGLISH KNOWLEDGE
I have noted that pramā is, unlike jñāna, factive. For Matilal, as we have 
seen, this brings the term closer to the English term knowledge. Recently, 
however, Pranab Sen has argued that English know is not factive (Sen 2000/ 
2007; Hazlett 2012 has more recently also defended this claim, apparently 
without acquaintance with Sen’s work). If he is right, then one possibility 
is that pramā is actually a better term to capture the normative concept 
epistemologists are interested in than knowledge is; knowledge in English 
would have parochial features that make it inappropriate or unsuitable for 
use in epistemology. If what we want to investigate is the epistemic credi-
bility of our cognitive life, then perhaps the Sanskrit vocabulary of pramā 
is a better vehicle for doing so than the English vocabulary of knowledge. 
There is also an important difference in perspective encoded in the two 
vocabularies. This follows from the fact that both pramā and jñāna refer 
to cognitive episodes, while the English term belief normally denotes a 
dispositional state. Thus, pramā is to be analyzed not as true belief but as a 
true awareness episode. A consequence is that pramā, as a cognitive event, 
has a causal history, and when one asks if a given cognitive event is pramā 
or not (whether it has pramātva, pramā- ness), it is natural to seek an an-
swer in the form of a causal explanation. One wonders whether the same 
causal factors that brought about the cognitive event also bring about its 
property of being true, for example. More generally, the term pramā refers 
to a successful performance of an act of experiencing, where success is a 
matter of experiencing things the way they are, hitting the truth, just as 
success for an archer is a matter of hitting the target with an arrow. In 
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Sanskrit intuition, epistemology is to be pictured as the study of cognitive 
performance.
The rather different picture that English vocabulary encourages is a static 
one in which there are standing dispositional states, somewhat like virtues, 
and the relevant question is not whether a performance is successful but 
whether a standing state is merited. Does the believer have the ability, if 
demanded to do so, to produce something that would count as evidence or 
justification for the claim that the belief is true? It would thus be wrong to 
translate pramā as knowledge, and then to wonder what counts as justifica-
tion in the Sanskrit model. The answer is that nothing does, because justi-
fication is a parochial feature of a way of thinking rooted in English lexical 
quirks. A different question must be posed instead: Are there any impor-
tant epistemic differences between different types of successful (truth- 
hitting) performances of experience?
3.  RIVAL INTUITIONS ABOUT PRAMĀ
Contextualism is a claim about the semantics of epistemic attribution. 
As DeRose (1992) puts it, “The truth- conditions of ‘S knows that p’ vary 
depending on the context in which it is uttered” (914), context here in-
cluding the interests, expectations, and so on of knowledge ascribers. As 
I will now show in some detail, two of the most important classical Indian 
epistemologists have strikingly divergent intuitions about the attribution- 
conditions of pramā. Śrīharṣa argues that truth alone does not suffice, 
and he presents a series of cases where a subject has a true awareness ep-
isode, but in which he claims no attribution of pramā is correct. Gaṅgeśa’s 
opposing view is that truth is sufficient, even in these cases. What seems to 
be in question is whether Śrīharṣa’s cases reveal something hidden about 
the truth- conditions of pramā— that more is in general called to ensure 
epistemic credibility than successful epistemic performance alone— or 
whether he is in fact manipulating our intuitions, that he is tutoring us 
into a new and more demanding way of using the term than is the case in 
ordinary speech.
I mentioned that for the ancients in India, epistemic success was a 
matter of cognizing nature (tattva- jñāna), experiencing things as they are 
(yathārtha- anubhūti). Outside of epistemic success lay not only inaccu-
rate experience but also doubt, dream, hypothesis, assumption, and pre-
tense. The value of epistemic success lay in the escape it afforded from the 
torments of a cognitive dystopia. It seemed to the ancients that the route 
to epistemic success was through the ability clearly to tell things apart, 
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and so through clarification of concepts and formulation of definitions. 
This included clarity about the concept of epistemic success itself, and the 
varied provenance of epistemic success. For how could one inquire unless 
one knew the techniques and targets of inquiry; and only through inquiry 
can there be clarity, and so in the end peace of mind. The energies of the 
classical philosophers were therefore spent, and lavishly so, in the search 
for definitions.
Śrīharṣa, in the twelfth century, saw all this as the height of folly. 
Mastery of a concept does not require knowledge of a definition, and 
that is good because nothing anyway can be defined, not even knowledge. 
Śrīharṣa invents a practice of refutation to set against the practice of defi-
nition, but he is not against the things themselves: there is argument and 
there is philosophy, just as there is experience and there is language; what 
there is not are definitions. Śrīharṣa was no skeptic, therefore, nor was he 
a quietist of Nāgārjunian bent. He was perfectly happy to commit himself 
to large philosophical claims and to make use of the efficacy of argument. 
Śrīharṣa is not against philosophy but wants a more liberal philosophical 
method, using concepts but not fixing them. One need not have a defini-
tion of aesthetic greatness to appreciate a particular work of art as great. 
Śrīharṣa’s argument that knowledge cannot be defined finds a more recent 
echo in the work of Timothy Williamson (2000; again, it is unfortunate 
that Williamson appears to be unacquainted with Śrīharṣa’s earlier work).
Śrīharṣa’s typical method of refutation was to tie the philosophers’ 
definitions in so many dialectical knots that they eventually choked to 
death. He claimed to prefer this method because its very complexity dis-
couraged abuse by the disingenuous. When it came to the definition of 
epistemic success, however, and only in this case, Śrīharṣa introduces a 
different approach (perhaps this is because Jayarāśi before him had tried 
the other approach without success). He tells miniature stories, the im-
port of which is that there can be accurate experience which is not epi-
stemic success. His stories serve to test— or perhaps to train— his readers’ 
epistemic intuitions. Let me call such any such story a “Śrīharṣa case.” His 
aim is not to show that the definition of epistemic success requires sup-
plementation but, rather, that the act of defining epistemic success is ab-
surd. This is why a Śrīharṣa case is different in ambition from a Gettier 
case in contemporary epistemology. A feature of the cases is that there is 
always an implied contrast scenario, and what is tested are the differential 
intuitions one has in the two scenarios. The first of four Śrīharṣa cases is 
the case of the Self- Confident Gambler. This gambler sees the closed fist of 
his opponent and is immediately convinced that the fist contains exactly 
five shells. His conviction is a pure guess, but Śrīharṣa is careful to point 
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out that the fact that chance is involved does not allow us to respond that 
he does not really believe; for a farmer, too, is convinced that the scattered 
seeds will yield a crop, even knowing at the same time that chance events 
may intervene. And indeed there are five shells in the closed fist; the con-
viction is correct. The implied contrast scenario is one where all is the same 
except that there are four shells, not five, and the gambler’s conviction is 
misplaced.
The second Śrīharṣa case is the case of the Deceived Deducer. A deduc-
tion is made to the effect that a fire is burning on the far- off mountain, 
based on the premise that a plume of smoke can be seen rising above it. 
What is seen, in fact, is a plume of mist in the crisp early morning air: the 
premise is false, but we are nevertheless to suppose that there is a fire and 
the deducer is accurate in his firmly inferred belief that this is so. Śrīharṣa 
says that the inferential belief that there is a fire on the mountain does 
not fall into the category of epistemic success (pramā), and it is not clear 
if he thinks he is simply reporting the intuition of any competent user of 
the Sanskrit word pramā or if he is actually tutoring those intuitions with 
the help of the story. It does not make any difference to the case that the 
deducer is not having a singular thought about a particular fire, and this 
case does in fact bear a structural resemblance to a standard Gettier case 
involving existentially quantified belief; and it was Matilal (1986, 135– 140) 
who was the first to point this out— since then, other Indian examples 
have been found in the work of the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, 
and an extensive Tibetan discussion has also been found (Stoltz 2007). 
In Dharmottara’s vivid example, a swarm of flies is taken as evidence that 
there is a piece of rotting meat: there is indeed meat there, but what looked 
like a swarm is in fact just black dust.
A third Śrīharṣa case is the case of the Misprimed Perceiver. A person 
spots a far- off creature and sees that it is a cow. The categorial perception 
is a result of the perceiver’s exercise of an ability to distinguish cows from 
other four- legged creatures by the visual cue of having a dewlap. In this 
case, however, visual cuing is achieved by a piece of cloth that hangs under 
the cow’s neck, not the dewlap; yet the perception is correct. Categorial 
perception is noninferential:  the role of the visual cue is not to provide 
a premise in a deduction but, rather, to trigger categorization. Śrīharṣa 
claims that the miscuing undermines the perceiver’s right to claim to know 
(and this example serves, by and by, to undermine Harman’s “no false 
lemmas” strategy against Gettier).
A fourth and final Śrīharṣa case appears only later in the discussion, and 
for that reason is often overlooked. This is the case of the Lucky Listener. 
An entirely unreliable witness reports that there are five flowers on the 
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bank of the river; and indeed there are. A second witness, this one wholly 
reliable, makes the same report. Here Śrīharṣa explicitly describes a pair 
of contrasting scenarios. In the first scenario, he seems to suggest, the 
listener has true belief but not epistemic success; in the second, the lis-
tener knows the reported fact. The point is that merely believing what one 
hears, even when true, is no way to know. Again, the Mādhyamika philos-
opher Candrakīrti had a similar example (and I wonder if Śrīharṣa knew of 
these Buddhist examples). Candrakīrti considers two people who testify to 
witnessing a crime, one actually having seen it happen and the other ma-
liciously lying. Should the judge base a guilty verdict on the testimony of 
the second person, our intuition is that justice has not been done (Matilal 
1986, 104). If fairness is to justice what truth is to epistemic success, then 
the point of the examples seems to be that conformity to a norm requires 
more than just getting it right.
One might be tempted initially to respond that in every case there is 
a fault in the functioning of the source of epistemic success, but Śrīharṣa 
argues that appeal to the origins of one’s beliefs cannot solve the problem 
of definition. That is because there is no way to say what the fault is, in 
terms general enough to cover every case, other than that the fault is that 
the source of the belief has not yielded accuracy. The proposed definition is 
now that epistemic success is true belief produced by a source that produces 
a true belief, and the new condition clearly adds nothing to the original. To 
give an example, it is certainly useful to know what are the sources of clean 
water, but one cannot define clean water by saying it is such water as comes 
from a certain source.
4.  GAṄGEŚA
For Śrīharṣa, the lesson to be learned is that the very attempt to define 
epistemic success is absurd. One response is that he has loaded the dice 
by asking for a context- free definition of a context- sensitive concept. 
The fourteenth- century Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa, though, draws a 
different conclusion. The lesson to be learned is that the right response 
to the Śrīharṣa cases cannot be to go in search of additional conditions on 
epistemic success. In those cases, something has gone wrong, but Śrīharṣa 
is manipulating our intuitions when he says that they are cases where ep-
istemic success comes apart from accuracy. The right response, according 
to Gaṅgeśa, is to reaffirm the original theory of epistemic success as ac-
curacy, and at the same time to diagnose the epistemic problem in the 
Śrīharṣa cases as having different origins. In every case, there is epistemic 
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success, but what we need to do is to draw a distinction between epi-
stemic success that is robust and epistemic success that is fragile. Fragile 
epistemic success is intolerant of even small variation in the parameters 
of the situation. There could easily have been four, not five, shells in the 
closed fist, and then the gambler would not have known. Fragile epistemic 
success is easily broken. This fragility explains why we are reluctant to 
agree that the gambler has acquired anything epistemically valuable, but 
acquiring merely fragile epistemic success is nevertheless not the same 
as failing to acquire epistemic success at all. Every one of the Śrīharṣa 
cases is an illustration of fragile epistemic success, not an example of ep-
istemic failure. Epistemic success really is nothing more than believing of 
something that it is what it is, and not believing of it that it is when it 
is not. The sources of epistemic success generally give rise to robustness, 
but even when they misfire, one may still be lucky enough to gain fragile 
epistemic success, although more often than not one will be led only to 
error or doubt. Epistemic success just is true belief, because when a be-
lief is true its causal history necessarily constitutes evidence for it (truth 
necessitates evidential etiology; necessarily, when a belief is true, cause 
equals because). Doubt destabilizes epistemic success, and when doubts 
have arisen— for example, in contexts of inquiry— what is needed to 
resolve them is robustness (the Sanskrit term niścaya being sometimes 
used here). Śrīharṣa tries to game our intuitions in such a way that we 
start to think what we meant all along by “epistemic success” is robust-
ness. Gaṅgeśa’s view is that we ought not even play the game he invites 
us to play— the game of searching for an additional condition. Epistemic 
success is a matter of hitting the target, winning the prize (here, truth), 
so “knowledge- ness consists in truth- hitting character” (Matilal 1986, 
141) and how one came to do it or whether one could repeat the feat does 
not change the fact that one has won.
Recently, a fascinating experiment was conducted. Various standard 
cases from contemporary epistemology, including Gettier cases and 
Goldman’s famous “barn” example, were translated into Sanskrit and 
a very learned traditional Sanskrit philosopher, Paṇḍit Viśvabandhu 
Bhaṭṭācārya— someone with no training in Western philosophy and very 
little English— was asked for his reaction (see Bhaṭṭācārya 2000). In every 
case, he insists that if the awareness is true, then it is proper to attribute 
pramā. His linguistic intuitions concur with Gaṅgeśa against Śrīharṣa. 
This, however, does not prevent one from distinguishing two different 
kinds of epistemic performance, with two different standards of success. 
Viśvabandhu is, however, steeped in the philosophical tradition of Gaṅgeśa, 
and this may itself have colored his intuitions.
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5.  CONCLUSION: THE UNIVERSALITY THESIS DENIED
The universality thesis states that “the properties of the English word 
know and the English sentence ‘S knows that p’ that have been studied by 
epistemologists are shared by the translations of these expressions in most 
or all languages.” I have argued not only that Sanskrit pramā, the closest 
term to English knowledge, has different properties, but that its properties, 
rather than those of the English term, are the ones most closely related 
to what epistemologists are actually interested in investigating. English 
epistemic vocabulary brings with it a variety of parochial associations, in-
cluding a static rather than a performative picture of epistemic agency, an 
emphasis on the “driving license” model of justification which skews dis-
cussion about the actual value of our epistemic practices, and even, if Sen is 
right, a nonfactive semantics quite at odds with the goals and aspirations of 
epistemology. What we are interested in as epistemologists is the nature of 
epistemic performance, the importance of epistemic agency, and the con-
cept of epistemic success. The Project Statement that inspired this volume 
of essays asks “What should philosophers interested in epistemology make 
of all this?” I suggest that what they should learn is the need to take seri-
ously how epistemology is done in languages other than English.
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